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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
January 19, 1979 Conference 
List 1, sheet 1 
No. 78-808-ADX 
Califano (HEW Secy) 
v. 
Boles (claimants of Social 
Security benefits) Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: The DJ held unconstitutional the provision of the 
ll 
Social Security Act which denies Mother's Insurance benefits to 
~
women who were never married to a deceaent although children of 
-- --~----------------------------the woman and the decedent are entitled to Children's Insurance 
benefits. 
FACTS: When Norman Boles died in 1971 he was married to 
Nancy Boles. Two sons were born of that mnrriage. The sons 
and Nancy Boles are receiving benefits under 42 u.s.c. § 402{g) 
which provides for separate benefits for mothers and children. 
Before Norman Boles married Nancy Boles he lived with resp 
Margaret Gonzales. ------. Resp Boles was born while Norman Boles and 
Margaret Gonzales were living together. Resp Boles is also 
9 -~~ 
Resp Gonzales has been receiving benefits under § 402(g). 
~A 
denied benefits because she was never married to Norman Boles.~ 
Resps sued petr claiming to represent the class of "all 
illegitimate children and their mothers who are presently ------~
ineligible for Mother's Insurance Benefits solely because 42 
u.s.c. § 402 (g) (1) restricts such benefits to women who were 
once married to the fathers of their children." 
HOLDING BELOW: The DC certified the national class and 
held the statute unconstitutional because it violated equal 
protection by discriminating against illegitimate children. ----
The court enjoined HEW from denying benefits to the class. The 
court also ordered petr to make retroactive ayments to resp 
~
and to notify all members o no longer 
ineligible for benefits solely because of the marriage 
.requirement. According to the DJ the decision turned on the 
characterization Qf the benefits. Petr claimed that the 
Mother's Benefits were intended to benefit the mother and that 
denial of the benefits did not affect the child. Resps argued 
that the purpose of § 402 was to benefit the child and that 
paying benefits to the mother would result in benefit to the 
-
child. The DJ sided with resp. 
In reaching that conclusion the DC relied upon Weinberger 
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648-49 (1975). The purpose of the 
payment of benefits to the mother, according to the DC, was to 
I 
permit the mother to stay at home with the child. 
CONTENTIONS: (1} Petr contends that the DC misinterpreted 
the purpose of the statutory scheme. · According to petr the 
benefits payable to the mother were designed to compensate for 
her loss of financial support, not to provide an additional 
payment to the children. With that intent, the statute's 
reliance upon marriage as an indicator of economic dependence 
was reasonable. In addition, petr points out that the total 
benefits paid as a result of Mr. Boles' death are limited 
because they are based upon his lifetime earnings. Any money 
paid to resp Gonzales will necessarily reduce the amount paid 
to Mrs. Boles and her two children, thereby thwarting the 
primary purpose of the section -- to permit a surviving parent 
to forego outside employment and stay home with the children. 
Resp argues that the payments are all designed to aid the 
children, citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645-53 
(1975}. Resp supports that position by pointing out that a 
widow with no children receives no benefits; that benefits are 
terminated once the child is no longer in the woman's custody; 
and that the benefits are terminated after the child reaches a 
certain age. Other than benefits that are dependent upon the 
relationship with a child the woman must wait until she reaches 
a specified age before she can receive benefits in her own 
right. 
Petr contends that the statute does not discriminate 
against illegitimates since they receive benefits under some 
conditions. Moreover, the status of illegitimacy is not 
suspect and this use is permissible. 
Resp replies that the discrimination violates the Fifth 
Amendment, citing Lalli v. Lalli, 47 U.S.L.W. 4061. 
(2) Petr argues that it was improper to certify a national 
-------------------------------------------~ 
class and to issue an injunction bas~d upon that class. By 
granting relief to those who had not filed a claim for benefits 
the DC violated the restriction of 42 u.s.c. § 405(g). 
According to petr the DC should have limited relief to the 
parties before it. Petr refers to its brief in California v. 
Elliott, No. 77-1511, cert granted, October 2, 1978. 
Resp contends that the limited relief granted in this case 
is permissible under § 405(g). All that the DC ordered was 
that petr notify persons who had been denied benefits that they 
were entitled to apply for them. Furthermore, § 405(g) is no 
bar to this action since jurisdiction was asserted under § 
1331, as a claim arising under the Constitution. 
(3) Petr contends that the United States had not waived its 
sovereign immunity and that the award of retroactive benefits 
was therefore inappropriate. Petr refers to pages 28-31 of its 
brief in California v. Aznavorian, 47 U.S.L.W. 4037 (December 
11, 1978) (Nos. 77-991, 77-5999). There petr contends that 42 
U.S.C. § 1383(b) permits retroactive benefits only when there 
has been an incorrect interpretation of the statute. In such 
cases, the decision of a court amounts to no more than an order 
that the administrator conform his conduct to the .intent of 
Congress. Therefore, § 1383 constitutes waiver of sovereign 
immunity to permit the retroactive payment of benefits that 
-
Congress intented the beneficiary to receive initially. By 
contrast, where Congress' intent is held to be 
unconstitutional, there can be no waiver of immunity. 
Resp contends that this argument is not properly before the 
- 5 -
Court because it was not raised below. Furthermore, resp 
contends that petr waived this defense by failing to plead it 
as an affirmative defense or to raise it below. 
DISCUSSION: The key question in petr's first contention is l whether § 402(g) was i~d to benefit children or mothers. 
The DC correctly concluded that the question has been answered 
by Weinber~ v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648-53 (1975). 
There the Court held that the purpose of § 402(g) was to 
provide children with an opportunity for the personal attention 
of the surviving parent. The Court examined the legislative 
history of the section and concluded that had Congress intended 
to benefit the surviving parent it would not have conditioned 
the receipt of benefits upon the presence of children. Petr's 
reliance upon Califano v. Jobst, 434 u.s. 47, 52-53 (1977), is 
'---- ----
misplaced. There the Court upheld the denial of benefits to a 
child who married, reasoning that it was rational to conclude 
that a married child is less likely to be dependent upon the 
parent for support. It does not follow from that conclusion 
that a woman who did not marry the father of her child is less 
likely to be economically dependent upon the father than is a 
woman who did marry him. Moreover, petr's argument focuse s on 
the wrong relationship: once it is conceded that the statute 
seeks to benefit children, the economic dependency of the 
mother is irrelevant. Since the statute does not deprive 
illegitimate children of Children's Benefits, the rationale of 
Jobst is of no relevance. 
Since § 402(g) is intended to benefit children after the 
death of a parent, the effect of denying benefits to women such 
as resp is to discriminate against illegitimate children. That 
discrimination is unconstitutional under decisions such as 
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
Petr's second contention is presented in California v. 
Elliott, No. 77-1511. This case should be ~eld for that one. -Petr's third contention was presented but not decided in 
California v. Aznavorian, 47 U.S.L.W. 4037, 4039 (December 12, 
1978). There app\.ars to be no reason in this case to depart 
from the established principle that an agent of the sovereign 
lacks the authority to waive sovereign immunity. See, ~, 
United States v. New York Rayon Importing Company, 329 U.S. 
654, 660 (1947). 
l 
The question therefore becomes whether Congress has waived 
the Government's immunity by enacting 42 u.s.c. § 1383(b). 
Petr's argument has some basis, beginning with the premise that 
waivers of immunity are to be strictly construed. In enacting 
sections of the Social Security law Congress intended that 
payments be made to certain beneficiaries. When a court 
determines that an administrative interpretation conflicts with 
Congress' intent and enjoins further reliance on that incorrect 
interpretation it can be said that the court has done nothing 
other than direct -what Congress originally intended. The 
original intent then becomes the basis for saying that Congress 
waived the Government's immunity from a retroactive award. In 
this case, Congress intended that mothers of illegitimate 
children not receive benefits. The declaration that such an 
intent is unconstitutional cannot form the basis for inferring 
that Congress waived immunity. But waiver may be inferred in 
another way. The prospective effect of a declaration that a 
statute violates equal protection · is to require Congress either 
- 7 -
to amend the statute to provide equal.ity of treatment or to 
repeal the classification altogether. With regard to the past 
the choice has already been made in favor of making payments~ 
Congress cannot repeal payments already made. Thus, the 
court's award of retroactive benefits can be said to conform 
the past conduct to the mandate of the Constitution. So the 
conclusion would be that the DC's award here does not violate 
sovereign immunity. Nevertheless, the question is one that the 
Conference may want to discuss as part of its broader 
consideration of the legal enforcement of the Social Security 
Act. 
There is a response. 
1/9/79 Pratt Opinion in JS 
P VtiVW VIt o o o o,,, o, o o o o o o o o •J li7, o o 
Argued ....... ............ , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
CALIFANO, SEC. HEW 
vs. 
BOLES, NORMAN J. 





Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . .J/. .... . 
Brennan, J ................ V. ........ . 
Stewart, J ........................... . 
White, J ............................ . 
"' .... Marshall, J .......................... . 
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . 
Powell, J ............... ............ . 
Rehnquist, J . .......... . 
Stevens, J ........................... . 
JURISDICTIONAL 
STATEMENT 
N POST DIS AFF 
~-············· 
. V. ............ . 
. V. ......... . 
v 
• •• 0. 0 0 •• 0 0 •• 
. /.. ........ . 
MERITS MOTION 
ABSENT 
REV AFF G D 
No. 78-808 
NOT VOTING 
• • • • 0 •• 0 0 •••••••••••••• ••• 0 • •••••• 0. 0 •• •• 0. 0 •• 0 ••••• 0 •••••• 0. 0 •• 0 •• 0. 0 ••• 0 •• 0. 0 0 0. 0 •• 
BB 4/19/79 
BOBTAIL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-808, Califano v. Boles 
If a wage earner who is fully insured under the Social 
Security program dies, his children are eligible for Children's 
Insurance Benefits. These are payable whether the child is 
legitimate or illegitimate. The wage earner's widow or former 
spouse (divorced before his death) may also be eligible for 
benefits, denominated Mother's Insurance Benefits, if she has 
legitimate or illegitimate children of the wage earner in her 
care. The question in this case, discussed in Section I of this -
memorandum, is whether the Equal Protection Clause is violated -------------------- ~ -- --
by this disqualification of women who have not married the wage ---- """ -
earner but who do have the children of the wage earner in their -
care. In Section II, I mention briefly two issues of remedy 
that are also presented. 
2. 
I 
The claimant-appellee in this action, Gonzales, is the 
mother of an illegitimate child by Boles, the deceased wage '------------
earner. That child collects Children•s Insurance Benefits, as 
'-----
do Boles• legitimate children; Boles• widow, who cares for the 
legitimate children, collects Mother•s Insurance Benefits. 
Gonzales cares for the illegitimate child, and on that basis 
applied for Mother•s Insurance Benefits. Because 42 U.S.C. 
§402(g) denies benefits to women who have not been married to 
the wage earner, the appellee•s application was refused. 
Appellee then filed this suit to challenge the 
constitutionality of §402(g). The DC certified a class 
"consisting of all illegitimate children and their mothers who 
are presently ineligible for Mother•s Insurance Benefits solely 
because 42 u.s.c. §402(g)(1) restricts such benefits to women 
who were once married to the fathers of their children." The 
appellee sought the following relief, which was granted by the 
DC: (i) a declaration that §402(g) is unconstitutional insofar 
as it excludes mothers in the plaintiff class; (ii) an 
injunction barring the appellants from denying Mother•s 
Insurance Benefits to mothers in the plaintiff class; (iii) 
payments of benefits to the named plaintiff retroactive to her 
application for the benefits; and (iv) notice to members of the 
plaintiff class that the unconstitutional bar to Mother•s 
Benefits had been removed. 
3. 
The appellee defends the judgment of the court below on 
the ground that Mother's Benefits are meant for the benefit of 
the children in the women's care. Eligibility for the benefits 
thus is conditioned in part on the women having children of the 
wage earner in her care. And the legislative history of §402(g) 
shows that the purpose underlying the section is to enable women 
"'----··-- ·--- - --~· ---·· 
who choose to do so to stay home and care for their children. 
"Congress was .•. concerned in §402(q) with •.• the 
principle that children of covered employees are 
entitled to the personal attention of the surviving 
parent if that parent chooses not to work. 
"Given the purpose of enabling the surviving 
parent to remain at home to care for a child, the 
gender-based distinction of §402(q) is entirely 
irrational." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636, 651 (1975). 
The appellees argue that given this congressional judgment that 
children of the waqe earner should have the care of the 
remaining parent, that care cannot be denied to illegitimate 
children. Yet, by conditioning eligibility on the marriage of 
the wage earner and the women caring for the child, ~402(g) does 
discriminate against illegitimates. 
The SG defends the statute on the ground that its 
purpose is to provide support for dependents of the deceased 
wage earner. It is the relationship of the beneficiary to the 
wage earner, he urges, that determines the beneficiary's prior 
dependence on the wage earner, and not the relationship of the 
beneficiary to another beneficiary. He points out that in the 
Court's cases, the use of marriage as a criterion of dependency 
has been upheld against constitutional challenge. E.g., 
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977) (provision of Social 
4. 
Security Act that benefits paid to disabled dependent child of a 
covered wage earner shall terminate when the child marries an 
individual who is not entitled to benefits under the Act held 
not to violate the Fifth Amendment because "marriage is an event 
which normally marks an important change in economic status"); 
Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (married women with 
minor children in her care whose husband retires or becomes 
disabled received benefits, while divorced women otherwise 
similarly situated do not; held, not to violate the Fifth 
Amendment because marriage is a fair indicator of economic 
dependence). 
I lean, though not strongly, towards the SG's position, 
on the basis of the following analysis. This case does not 
~ involve 
/"- ... A~ {/"'.... earner. 
the payment of benefits to minor children of the wage 
All ~ildren, legitimate and illegitimate alike, 
/ 
J;:; 
are eligible for such benefits. The only basis for challenging 
the statute is the derivative and de facto (rather than 
~intentional) discrimination against illegitimates that results 
~ from the marriage criterion for Mother's Benefits. Those 
:~~legitimates who live with a woman who was not married to their 
~· father do not get the derivative benefit of having their 
caretaker receive Mother's Benefits. (On the other hand, 
illegitimates who do happen to live with a woman who was married 
to the wage earner qualify that woman for Mother's Benefits, and 




of the second ry benefits to depende~t~  The purpose 
under the Social Security Act is to replace the support provided 
by the wage earner. Even if the purpose of the Mother's 
Benefits is to allow women to stay home and continue to care for 
children of the wage earner living with them, the marriage 
requirement represents a defensible estimate of which women were 
dependent on the wage earner. Only these wome~re likely to need - _., 
the replacement of the support previously provided by the wage 
earner if they are to have the option of staying at home to care 
for the children. And it is only these women, and not all needy 
women with children in their care, that are the concern of the 
Social Security program. Accordingly, the proper way of 
characterizing the legislative policy underlying §402(g) is that -
Congress intended to provide benefits for those women who were 
dependent on the wage earner (as measured by the marriage 
-----------~-------------
criterion) so that they could have the option of remaining at 
home to care for the minor children of the wage earner in their 
care. An illegitimate child living with his mother is denied 
the indirect benefit of Mother's Benefits not because he is 
illegitimate but because his mother was not dependent on his 
father for support. 
The SG is correct in pointing out that this Court's 
prior cases have approved similar uses ~he marriage criterion 
to measure dependency. In addition to Jobst and DeCastro, 
mentioned above, I think that~einberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 
(1975), can be numbered among this group. There the Court 




surviving spouse must have been married to the deceased wage 
earner for at least nine months to qualify for benefits upon the 
death of the wage earner. In his extensive opinion for the 
Court, Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the general applicability of 
the rationality test to legislative classifications such as the 
marriage criterion. 
There is a credible argument that the marriage 
criterion, as used in §202(g), does not meet this rationality 
test because it is overinclusive and underinclusive. It is 
overinclusive to the extent that any previous marriage to the 
wage earner (including ones ended in divorce long before the 
wage earner's death) will meet the requirement. In many 
instances in which the wage earner has divorced his spouse 
before his death, there may be no obligation of continuing 
support and no support in fact by the wage earner. And it is 
underinclusive to the extent that some women caring for 
illegitimate children are in fact supported by the wage earner-
fathers of those children. 
I take it, however, that to invalidate the statute 
under the Dandridge v. Williams test, it would have to be shown 
that the marriage criterion did result in fact in significant 
over- and underinclusion. There has been no such factual 
showing in this case, and I do not think that the facts are so 
apparent as to obviate the need for evidence. 
One difference between the prior cases dealing with the 
marriage exception and the present case is that none of the 
prior cases involved a claim that the marriage distinction 
discriminated indirectly against illegitimates. But the 
statute's effect on some illegitimate children is indirect and 
unintended, and does not seem to me to call for any more 
demanding standard than the rationality test of Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). This kind of indirect and 
unintended consequence of an otherwise rational classification 
does not amount to the invidious discrimination against 
specially protected groups that runs afoul of the equality 
principle of the Fifth Amendment. 
"The relation between the equal protection 
analysis of Dandridge and the Fifth Amendment due 
process analys1s of Flemming v. Nestor and 
Richardson v. Belcher was descri5ed in the latter 
case in this language: 
7. 
"A statutory classification in the area of 
social welfare is consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if 
it is 'rationally based and free from invidious 
discrimination.' Dandridge v. Williiams, 397 
U.S. 471, 487." Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 
770. 
The SG makes the foregoing argument in the strongest 
.:::___..,_ 
terms by insisting that under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976), only intentional acts of discrimination against 
illegitimates should be subject to special scrutiny. I think 
that there is considerable merit in this suggestion. Although 
the Court has consistently refused to subject classifications 
based on illegitimacy to "strict scrutiny," it is also true that 
such classifications have been subject to special examination. 
Such special scrutiny would seem to be justified only when the 
classification is expressly in terms of illegitimacy, or 
expressly intended to discriminate against illegitimates on 
account of their illegitimacy. Otherwise, any correlation 
between an otherwise rational classification and 
disproportionate effects on illegitimate children is simply 
coincidental, and not constitutionally objectionable. 
II 
8. 
The SG also raises two points regarding the remedy 
ordered by the DC. He argues that retroactive benefits for the 
named plaintiff are barred by sovereign immunity, and that the 
jurisdictional provision of the Social Security Act under which 
this suit must be maintained precludes the remedy of notice to 
all newly eligible women. 
The SG contends that §205(g) of the Social Security Act 
merely gives the DC jurisdiction to hear cases challenging 
determinations of eligibility for Social Security benefits, and 
does not constitute in addition ·a waiver of sovereign immunity 
from damage claims based on wrongful denial of benefits. He 
relies on United States v. Testan, 424 u.s. 392 (1976), which 
reached a similar conclusion about the jurisdictional provision 
of the Tucker Act. 
This argument is a good one, but does not go as far as 
the SG would like. Another section of the Social Security Act, 
Section 204(a), directs the payment of retroactive benefits to 
persons wrongfully denied benefits to which they are entitled 
under the Act. The SG argues that this section only applies 
when the denial was based on a misconstruction of the Act rather 
than a proper construction of a provision later held 
unconstitutional. This is not an unreasonable reading of the 
section, which does refer to failures to make payments due "to 
9. 
any person under this subchapter". But I think that the more 
reasonable construction of §204(a) is that it authorizes 
retroactive payment of benefits wrongfully denied on the basis 
of an unconstitutional condition of eligibility as well as on an 
incorrect construction of the statute. The statute has been 
construed in this fashion by Justice Stevens when he was sitting 
as a circuit judge. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 704 
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). 
The SG also argues that the class relief granted was 
improper for several reasons. Section 205(g) of the Social 
-----
Security Act, the jurisdictional statute for claims arising 
under the Act, provides in pertinent part as follows: 
"Any individual, after any final decision of the 
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a 
party, ••. may obtain review of such decision by a 
civil action commenced within sixty days after the 
mailing to him of notice of such decision or within 
such further time as the Secretary may allow. Such 
action shall be brought in the district court of the 
United States for the judicial district in which the 
plaintiff resides or has his principal place of 
business •.•. 11 
The SG argues that when read in conjunction with 
§205(h), which provides that "[n]o action against the United 
States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall 
be brought under section 41 [§§1331 et seq.] of Title 28 to 
recover on any claim arising under this subchapter", §205(g) 
provides the sole jurisdictional basis for any action raising a 
claim under the Social Security laws. The SG makes several 
assertions about §205(g). First, since the section explicitly 
states "any individual," class relief is not available. Second, 
even if class relief is available, the class may only include 
1 0 0 
persons who have applied for benefits and been denied them by 
the Secretary, while here the class was described simply as all 
women (or mothers) ineligible for benefits by reason of §202(g). 
Third, the class must be restricted to members residing or 
having their principal place of business in the same judicial 
district as the named plaintiff, while here the DC ordered 
relief for a nationwide class. 
These issues were fully aired in Califano v. Elliott, 
No. 77-1511, argued during March. The opinion in the case has 
been assigned to Justice Blackmun, and I have spoken with his 
clerk about the §205(g) question. Bill says that the question 
was reached and decided in Elliott by a vote of 8-0, but 
confesses that he cannot tell from Justice Blackmun's notes 
exactly what resolution was agreed upon by the Conference. He 
intends to ask Justice Blackmun to take the occasion of the 
present case to clarify the position of the Conference on the 
question. 
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April 27, 1979 
Re: 78-808 - Califano v. Boles 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
At Conference I expressed my view, echoing Brandeis, 
that it was more important to settle this issue with a 
uniform standard nationwide than to be "right." I have 
now concluded that no cases, including Jimenez, either 
compel or point toward an affirmance. ~he case is to 
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April 28, 1979 
78-808 Califano v . Boles 
Dear Chief: 
t nassed at the Conference v~sterday. On the basis 
of further consideration, I now vote to reverse . 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
~·~~---------------------------------~--J 
To: The Chief Jus~eJ' A 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
0. 78-808 
Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary 1 
of Health, Education, and j 
Welfare, Appellant, 
v. 
Norman J . Boles et, al. 
On Appeal from the United 
States District Court for 
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MR. JusTICE REHNQUIS'r delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Since the Depression of the 1930's, the Government has 
taken increasingly upon itself the task of insulating the 
economy at large and the individual from the buffeting of 
economic fortune. The federal old-age, survivors, and dis-
ability insurance provisions of the Social Security Act (SSA) 
are possibly the pre-eminent examples: attempts to obviate, 
through a program of forced savings, the economic dislocations 
that may otherwise accompany old age, disability or the death 
of a breadwinner. As an exercise in governmental adminis-
tration, the social security system is of unprecedented dimen-
sion; in Fiscal Year 1977 nearly 150 million claims were filed. 1 
Given this magnitude, the number of times these SSA 
claims have reached this Court warrants little surprise.2 Our 
1 Social Secunty Administration';; Office of Management and Admini -
tration, The Year in Review: The Administration of Social Security Pro-
grams 1977, at ii (July 1978) . 
2 Califmw v. Jobst, 4:34 U.S. 47 (1977); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 
3'13 (1977) ; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977); Matthews v. 
De Castro, 429 U. S. 181 (1976); Norton v. Mathews, 427 U. S. 524 
(1976); Mathett•s v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U. S. 319 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U. S. 749 (1975); Wein-
berger v. Wwsenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Jimmez v. Weinberger, 417 
U. S. 628 (1974); Richardson v. Wright, 405 U S. 208 (1972) ; Richardson • 
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cases evidence a sensitivity to the legislative and administra-
tive problems posed in the design of such a program and in 
the adjudication of claims on this scale. The problems are 
generally of two types. The first is categorization.3 In light 
of the ilpecific dislocations Congress wishes to alleviate. it is 
necessary to define categories of beneficiaries. The process of 
categorization presents the difficulties i11herent in any line-
drawing exercise where the draftsman confronts a universe of 
potential beneficiaries with different histories and distinct 
needs. He strives for a level of generality that is administra-
tively practicable, with full appreciation that the included 
class has members whose "needs" upon a statutorily defined 
v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) ; Richm·dson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 
(Hl71) ; Flemming v. Nestor , 363 U.S. 603 (1960) . This Court ha::; also 
had mnnrrous ca.~('~ involving rlaim~ tlfl~ing und('r frderal-state cooperative 
welfare program,: authoriz('d by the SSA. See, e. g., Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (A~i,.;tancc to Prr,;ons Permanently and Totally 
Disabled) ; California Dept. of Human Resources Development v. Java, 
402 U . S. 121 (1971) (unrmployment insurance); Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U. R. 471 (1970) (Aid to Familirs With Dependent Children). 
8 Th(' bulk of om rases fall under this heading. Califano v. Jobst, 434 
U. S. 47 (Hl77) (termumtiOn of drprndent child's benefits upon his mar-
riage) ; Califano v. Webste1·, 4:30 U. S. 313 (1977) (gender-based differ-
rnces in benefit c·omputation) ; Califa:no v. Goldfarb, 430 U .S. 199 (1977) 
(grnder-ba~rcl diffrrrnees in dPfining d('prndt>nt of drrra,.;Pcl wage eamrr); 
Matthews, .. De ('astra, 429 l l. S. 181 (1976) (denial of "wife's insurance 
brnefits" to divorced women under 62 yPars of age) ; Norton v. Mathews, 
427 U. S. 524 (1976) (illegitimate children denied presumption of depend-
ency rnjoyrd by lrgitimatrs ) ; Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495 (1976) 
(snmo n~ Nortou) ; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975) (duration-
of-relation::;hip requirrment::; for receipt of mot-her's or child's insurance 
benefit~) ; ll'einber(Jer v. ll'iesenfeld. 420 U. S. 636 (1975) (grnder-based 
rlrnial of Rurvivor·~ brnefit~ to Widowrr,.;) ; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 
U. S. 628 (Hl74) (denial of rli~ability insurance benefits to illegitimate 
rhildren born aftPr onsf\t. of wage ramer's diHability); Richardson v. 
Belcher. 404 U. S. 7R ( 1971) ( rrductwn in socwl ::;ecurity benefits to reflect 
&tnte workmrn '::; c-ompensation brnefitH); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 
603 (19GO) (termination of in::;uranre benrfits to aliens upon their 
deportation) . 
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occurrence may not be as marked as those of isolated individ-
uals outside the classification. "General rules are essential 
if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a 
modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably pro-
duce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual 
cases." Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977). A process 
of case-by-case adjudication that would provide a "perfect fit" 
in theory would increase administrative expenses to a degree 
that benefit levels would probably be reduced, precluding a 
perfect fit in fact. Mat hews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 509 
(1976); Weinberger v. Sal-fi, 422 U.S. 749, 776-777 (1975). 
The second type of problem that has been brought to this 
Court invol vcs the Social Security Administration's pro-
cedures for dispute resolution where benefits have been 
denied, decreased or terminated because the Administra-
tion has concluded that the claimant is not entitled to what 
he has requested or to what he has received in the past.4 
Again the Court has been sensitive to the special difficulties 
presented by the mass administration of the social security 
system. After the legislative task of classification is com-
pleted, the administrative goal is accuracy and promptness in 
the actual allocation of benefits pursuant to those classifica-
tions. The magnitude of that task is not amenable to the 
full trappings of the adversary process lest again benefit levels 
be threatened by the costs of administration. Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 343-349 (1976); Richardson v. 
Perales, 402 U. S. 389, 406 (1971). Fairness can best be 
assured by Congress and the Social Security Administration 
4 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (question whether eviden-
tiary hearing nece::;sary before termination of disability ir:;urance benefits); 
Richardson Y. Wright. 405 U. S. 208 (1972) (challenge to procedures 
employed in suspen::;ion or termination of cli::;ability benefit::;); Richardson 
\'. Pel'ales. 402 U. S. 389 (1971) (written reports by phy::;ician::; who have 
examined disability in::;urancc claimants are "::;ub::;tantial evidence" sup,.. 
porting denial of benefits) . 
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through sound managerial techniques and quality control 
designed to achieve an acceptable rate of error. 
This case involves a challenge to a categorization. Appellees 
Norman J. Boles and Margaret Gonzales represent a nation-
wide class of all illegitimate children and their mothers who 
are allegedly ineligible for insurance benefits under the Social 
Security Act because in each case the mother ~neve; mar-
ried to the wa e earner who fathered her child. Section 202 
(g) 1) o the Social , ecun y c , 42 U. S. C. § 402 (g) (1) 
(1976), only makes "mother's insurance benefits" available to 
widows and divorced wives 5 By virtue of this Court's deci-
5 Section 202 (g) (1) providt'$ : 
"(g) (1) The widow and every , urviving divorced mother (as defined 
in section 216 (d)) of an individual who diE'd a fully or currently insured 
individual, if such widow or :;urviving divorced mother-
" (A) i:-; not. marncd, 
"(B) is not entitled to a widow's insurancE' bE'nefit, 
"(C) is not entitled to old-agE' insurancE' benefits, or is entitled to old-age 
insurance benefits each of which is less than three-fourths of the primary 
insuraneo amount of such individual, 
" (D) has filed application for mother 's insurance bE'nefits, or was entitled 
to wife's immrance benefits on the basis of the wages and self-employment 
income of such individual for the month preceding the month in which he 
died, 
"(E) a.t, the time of filing such application has in her care a child of such 
individual E'ntitled to a child'::; insurance benefit, and 
" (F) in the case of a survivmg divorced mothcr-
" (i) the child referred to in subparagraph (E) is her son, daughter, or 
legally adopted child, and 
"(ii) the benefits referred to in such subparagraph are payable on the 
basis of such individual's wage,; and ~elf-employment income, 
"shall (subject to subsection (s) of th1s section) be entitled to a mother's 
insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first month after 
August 1950 in which she bE'comE's RO mtitlcd to such insurance benefits 
and ending with the month preceding the first month in which any of the 
following occurs: no child of such deceased individual i::; entitled to a 
child's insurance bE'nefit, such widow or surviving divorced mother bE'comes 
en! itled to nn old-age in:ourance benefit equal to or exceeding three-fourths 
of the primary in~urance amount of HU('h deceased individual, she becomes 
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sion in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975), 
"mother's insurance benefits" are available to widowers, leav-
ing the title of these benefits a misnomer. There we held 
that the provision of such benefits only to women violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Norman W. Boles died in 1971. He left a widow, Nancy L. 
Boles, and their two children, who were each promptly awarded 
child's insurance benefits. Nancy Boles receives mother's 
insurance benefits. Appellee Gonzales lived with Norman W. 
Boles for three years before his marriage to Nancy Boles and 
bore a son by him, Norman J. Boles.6 Gonzales sought 
mother's insurance benefits for herself and child's benefits 
for her son. Her son was granted benefits, but her personal 
request was denied because she had never been married to the 
wage earner. 
Gonzales exhausted her administrative remedies and then 
filed this suit in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Texas. The District Court certified a 
class o{ "all illegitimate children and their mothers who are 
presently ineligible for Mother's Insurance Benefits solely 
because 42 U. S. C. § 402 (g) (I) restricts such benefits to 
entitled to a widow's insuranoo benefit, she remarries, or she dies. Entitle-
ment to such benefit::; shall also <:>nd, in the case of a surviving divorced 
mother, with the month immediately preceding the first month in which 
no son, daughter, or legally adopted child of such surviving divorced 
mother is entitled to a child's insurance benefit on the basis of the wages 
and self-employment income of such deceased individual." 
Secii0n 216 (d) (:3), 42 U.S. C. ~ 4Hi (d) (3) (1976), state~ : 
"(3) The term 'surviving divorced mother' means a woman divorced 
from an individual who has died, but only if (A) she is the mother of his 
son or daughter, (B) she legally adopted his son or daughter while she 
was married to him and while such son or daughtrr was undrr the age of 
18, (C) he legally adoptrd her son or daughter while she was married to 
him and while such son or daughter was under the age of 18, or (D) she 
was married to him at the time both of them legally adopted a child under 
the age of 18." 
6 Norman W. Bole~ had acknowledged his paternity of Norman J. Boles. 
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women who were once married to the fathers of their chil-
dren." J. S., at 1a. The District Court found that ~ 202 (g) 
(1) of the Social Security Act was unconstitutional. There 
were three steps in its logic. 
First, it read Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, as holding 
that mother's insurance benefits are chiefly for the benefit of 
the child. Tt quoted from a passage in that opinion where 
this Court observed that 
"§ 402 (g). linked as it is directly to responsibility for 
minor children. was intended to permit women to elect 
not to work and to devote themselves to the care of 
children . . .. 
"That the purpose behind ~ 402 (g) is to provide chil-
dren deprived of one parent with the opportunity for the 
personal attention of the other could not be more clear 
in the legislative history." 420 U. S., at 648-649. 
On the basis of this language it then concluded that for pur-
poses of equal protection analysis, the pertinent discrimination 
in this case is not unequal treatment of unwed mothers, 
but rather discrimination against illegitimate children. In 
its final step the District Court held that the application of 
§ 202 (g)( 1) at issue here is unconstitutional, relying on cases 
of this Court invalidating on constitutional grounds legislation 
that discriminated against illegitimates solely because of their 
status at birth. E. g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Co., 406 U. S. 164 (1972); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U. S. 535 
(1973); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628 (1974); 
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
We noted probable jurisdiction, - U. S. -, and now 
conclude that the District Court incorrectly analyzed the 
equal protection issue in this case. We accordingly reverse: 
As this Court noted in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at 
643, § 202 (g) "was added to the Social Security Act in 1939 
as one of a large number of amendments designed to 'afford 
more adequate protectioll to the family .as a unit.' H. R. 
18-808-0PINIO 
CALIFA 0 v. BOLES 7 
Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1939)." The benefits 
created in 1939 "were intended to provide persons dependent 
on the wage earner with protection against the economic 
hardship occasioned by loss of the wage earner's support." 
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 50 (1977); see Mathews v. 
De Castro, 429 U. S. 181, 185-186 (1976). Specifically, § 202 
(g) "was intended to permit women [and now men] to elect 
not to work and to devote themselves to care of children." 
420 U. S., at 648. The animating concern was the economic 
dislocation that occurs when the wage earner dies and the sur-
viving parent is left with the choice to stay home and care 
for the children or to go to work, a hardship often exacerbated 
by years outside the labor force. "Mother's insurance ben-
efits" were intended to make the choice to stay home easier. 
But the program was not designed to be, and we think is not 
now, a general system for the dispensing of child-care sub-
sidies.7 Instead Congress sought to limit the category of 
beneficiaries to those who actually suffer economic dislocation 
upon the death of a wage earner and are likely to be con-
fronted at that juncture with the choice between employment 
or the assumption of full-time child-care responsibilities. 
In this light there is an obvious logic in the exclusion from 
§ 202 (g) of women or men who have never married the wage 
earner. "Both tradition and common experience support the 
conclusion that marriage is an event which normally marks an 
important change in economic status." Califano v. Jobst, 
434 U. S. 47, 53 (1977). Congress could reasonably conclude 
that a woman who has never been married to the wage earner 
is far less likely to be dependent upon the wage earner at the 
7 Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 52 (1977) • 
"The statutr is dr,;igned to providr the wagr eamer and the dependent 
members of his family with protect 1011 again;;t the hardship occa.'<ioned by 
his loHS of earning~ ; it is not Simply a welfare program generally brnefiting 
needy per::;onR." 
See also Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 1R1, 185-186 (1976) . 
' . 
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time of his death. He was never legally required to support 
her and therefore less likely to have been an important source 
of income. Thus the possibility of severe economic disloca-
tion upon his death is more remote. 
We confronted an analogous classification in Mathews v. 
De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976), which involved a challenge to 
the exclusion of divorced women from "wife's income bene-
fits." In concluding that the classification did not deny equal 
protection, we observed : 
"Divorce by its nature works a drastic change in the 
economic and personal relationship between a husband 
and wife. . . . Congress could have rationally assumed 
that divorced husbands and wives depend less on each 
other for financial and other support than do couples who 
stay married. The problems that a divorced wife may 
encounter when her former husband becomes old or dis-
abled may well differ in kind and degree from those that 
a woman married to a retired or disabled husband must 
face . . . . She may not feel the pinch of the extra 
expenses accompanying her former husband's old age or 
disability. . . . It was not irrational for Congress to 
recognize this basic fact in deciding to defer monthly 
payments to divorced wives of retired or disabled wage 
earners until they reach the age of 62. " /d., at 188-189. 
Likewise, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) , upheld a 
nine-month duration of relationship eligibility requirement 
for the wife and step-children of a deceased wage earner. The 
stated purpose of the requirement was "to prevent the use of 
sham marriages to secure Social Security payments." Id., at 
767. We found that only relevant constitutional argument 
was whether "the test [appellees could not] meet ·[was] not 
so rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective that 
it [could] be used to deprive them of benefits available to 
those who fdid] satisfy that test.'' Td., at 772. We recognized 
18-808-0PINION 
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that the statutory requirement would deny benefits in some 
cases of legitimate, sincere marriage relationships. 
"While it is possible to debate the wisdom of excluding 
legitimate claimants in order to discourage sham relation-
ships, and of relying on a rule which may not exclude 
some obviously sham arrangements, we think it clear 
that Congress could rationally choose to adopt such a 
course. Large numbers of people are eligible for these 
programs and are potentially subject to inquiry as to the 
validity of their relationships to wage earners. . . . Not 
only does the prophylactic approach thus obviate the 
necessity for large numbers of individualized determina-
tions, but it also protects large numbers of claimants who 
satisfy the rule from the uncertainties and delays of 
administrative inquiry into the circumstances of their 
marriages." !d., at 781-782. 
It is with this background that we must analyze what the 
District Court in this case perceived to be the flaw in relying 
on dependence as a rationale for the statutory distinction be-
tween married and unmarried persons. The District Court 
pointed out that in 1972 Congress lifted the requirement that 
divorced women seeking mother's insurance benefits show that 
they were in some measure dependent on the wage earner 
immediately before his death.8 It seized this fact as refuta-
8 Originally, nothing similar to mother's insurance benefits for divorced 
women was provided by the Social Security Act. Then in 1950 these bene-
fits, subject to limitations not relevant here, were made available to a 
surviving divorced wife, if she had not remarried, had a child in her care 
entitled to child's insurance benPfits, and at the time of the wage Pamer's 
death had been rect>iving at least one-half of hrr support from him. Act 
of Augus1 28, 1950, Pub. L. 734, ch. 809, § 101 (a), 64 S1at. 485-486. 
In 1965 tht> remarriage bar to mother'~ insurance brnt>fits was relaxed. 
A woman's rights as a surviving divorced mothrr would be rt>stored if her 
second marriagt> ended in divorcr. Mort>ovt>r, a showing that she was 
receiving or entitled to recrive "substantial contributions" from the wage 
earner ~~t the time of hi" death would ~uffice in lieu of a showing that she 
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tion of any characterization of these benefits as an attempt to 
ease the dislocation of those who had been dependent on the 
deceased. We think the District Court is demanding a preci-
sion not warranted by our cases. 
Certainly Congress did not envision such precision. The 
legislative history surrounding the devolution of support re-
quirements suggests that its effect on mother's insurance ben-
efits was au incidental and relatively minor byproduct of 
Congress' core concern: older women who were married to 
wage earners for over 20 years-women who often only knew 
work as housewives-who were not eligible for surviving 
divorced wife's insurance benefits because state divorce laws 
did not permit alimony or because they had accepted a prop-
erty settlement in lieu of alimony.0 The Social Security laws 
received at least one-half of hrr support from the wage earner. Act of 
July 30, 1965, Pub. L. 89-97, § 308,79 Sta1. 377-379. 
Finally in 19i2 Congrrss madr thr changrs cli;;cusl:'ed by the Di~trict 
Court. Pub. L. 92-603, § 114 (c), 86 Stat. lMR--1:349. 
9 lntercstingly, younger women receiving mother's benefit~ are not even 
mentioned in the committee report A on the 1972 amendment. 
"Benefits, under prrsent law, arc payablr to a divorced wifr age 62 
or older and a divorrrd widow age fiO or older if her marriage lasted at 
least 20 yrars before the dtvorce, and to a survtving divorced mother. 
In order to qualify for any of th<'::ie benrfitH a divorced woman is required 
to show that: ( 1) slw was receiving at lea~t one-half of her support from 
her former husband; (2) ~he was receiving substantial contributions from 
her former husband pur~uant to a written agreement; or (3) there was a 
court order in effect providing for sub~tantial contributions to her support 
by her former husband. 
"In some States the courts arc prohibited from providing for alimony, 
and in these States a divorcrd woman is precluded from mreting the 
third support rrquirement. Even in States which allow alimony, the 
court may have decided at thr time of the divorce that the wife was 
not in need of financial support. Moreover, a divorced woman's eligibility 
for social security benefits may depend on the advice she received at the 
time of her divorce. If a woman accepted a proprrty settlement in lieu 
of alimony, she could, 111 effect, have d;squalifird herself for divorced wife's, 
divorced widow's, or surviving divorced mother's benefits. 
' . 
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have maintained uniform support requirements for divorced 
wife's, divorced widow's, and surviving divorced mother's ben-
efits. Obviously administration is thereby simplified. Un-
doubtedly some younger divorced wives with children of 
deceased wage earners in their care who could not meet the 
old support requirements incidentally benefit from Congress' 
concern that many older women were being victimized once 
by state divorce laws and again by the Social Security laws.10 
However, when Congress seeks to alleviate hardship and 
inequity under the Social Security laws, it may quite rightly 
conceive its task to be analogous to painting a fence, rather 
than touching up an etching. We have repeatedly stated 
that there is no constitutio11al requirement that "a statutory 
provision filter[] out those, and only those, who are in the 
factual position which generated the congressional concern 
reflected in the statute." Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 777; 
Matthews v. De Castro, supra, at 189. In sum, we conclude 
"The intent of providing benefits to divorced women is to protect women 
whose marriages are dissolved when they arc far along in years-particu-
larly housewives who have not been able to work and earn social security 
protection of their own. The committee believes that the support require-
ments of the law have operated to deprive some divorced women of the 
protection they should have received and, thC'refore, recommends that these 
requirements be eliminated. The requirement that the marriage of a 
divorced wife or widow must have lasted for at least 20 years before the 
divorce would not be changed." 
S. Rep. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 142 (1972); see H. R. Rep. No. 231, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess., 54-55 (1971). When the 1965 change· were made 
there was only pa::;sing mrntion of younger women receiving mother's in-
surance benefits. S. Rep. No. 3Rl, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 108 (1965). 
10 There are no precise figures a, to the extra cost to the insurance fund 
posed by this expansion of mother's insurance benefits. It ran be inferred 
from the attention this expan~ion received in the legislative- history that its 
cost was a rclativrly small part of the $23 million annual increase in bene-
fits estimated for eliminating support requirements across the board. 
SeeS. Rep. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Ses::;., 142 (1972). HEW has esti-
mated that compliance with the District Court's decision in this ca::;e will 
eost $60 million annually. 
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that the denial of mother's insurance benefits to women who 
never married the wage earner bears a rational relation to the 
government's desire to ease economic privation brought on by 
the wage earner's death. 
But the appellees argue that to characterize the problem in 
this fashion is to miss the point because at root this case 
involves discrimination against illegitimate children. Quite 
naturally, those who seek benefits denied them by statute 
will frame the constitutional issue in a manner most favorable 
to their claim. The proper classification for purposes of equal 
protection analysis is not an exact science, but scouting must 
begin with the statutory classification itself. Only when it is 
shown that the legislation has a substantial disparate impact 
on classes defined in a different fashion may analysis continue 
on the basis of the impact on those classes. 
We conclude that the legislation in this case does not have 
the impact on illegitimates necessary to warrant further 
inquiry whether § 202 (g) is the product of discriminatory 
purposes. See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. 
Feeney, No. 78-233 (1979). "Mother's insurance benefits" 
are distinct from "child's insurance benefits." The latter are 
benefits paid to the minor children of the deceased wage 
earner n and, as noted. Gonzales' son did receive child's insur-
ance benefits. The benefit to a child as a result of the parent 
or guardian's receipt of mother's insurance benefits is inciden-
tal: mother's insurance benefit payments do not vary with the 
number of children within the recipient's care. they are not 
available in the foster care context, and they are lost on 
remarriage or if the surviving parent earns a substantial in-
come-all despite the needs of the child. Thus the focus of 
11 In Jimenez v. Weinbe1'gel', 417 U. S. 628 (1974), thio Court struck 
down an absolute bar to child'~ insurance benefits for illegitimate children 
whose patPrnity had never bern arknowPldgPd or affirmPd by rvidence of 
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these benefits is on the economic dilemma of the surviving 
spouse or former spouse; the child's needs as such are ad-
dressed through the separate child's insurance benefits.' 2 Nor 
is it invariably true that whatever derivative benefits are en-
joyed by the child whose parent or guardian receives mother's 
insurance benefits will not be enjoyed by Hlegitimate children. 
If the illegitimate child is cared for by the decreased wage 
earner's wife , she will receive mother's insurance benefits even 
though she has no natural children of her own and never 
adopted the child. tn And many legitimate children live in 
households that are not headed by individuals eligible for 
mother's benefits. 
In order to make out a disparate impact warranting further 
scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, it is necessary to show that the class which is pur-· 
portedly discriminated against consequently suffers signifi-
cant deprivation of a benefit or imposition of a substantial 
12 There iR obviously a signifirant difference brtwrPn this interpretation 
of the statutory purpose and that subscribrd to by thr author of this 
opinion in his Heparatc concurrrner in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636, 655 ( 1975) . To the extmt that the8e intrrpretations conflict , the 
author feels he can do no bettrr than quotr Mr. Justice Ja ckson, concurring 
in McGrath v . Kri.stensen, 340 U. S. 162, 177-178 (1950): 
"Precedent, however, is not laeking for ways by which a judge may recede 
from a prior opinion that has proven unt enable and perhaps mislPd others. 
See Chief Justice Taney, License Ca.ses, 5 How . 504, recanting views he 
had prPSsed upon the Court as Attorney GPneml of Ma ryland in Brown 
v. Maryland, 12 Whrat. 419. Baron Bramwell Pxtricnted himself from a 
somewhat similar Pmharassmrnt h~· sa~·ing, 'The matter dm•s not appear 
to mr now as it appears to havr appearPd to me then.' Andrews v. Stymp, 
26 L. T . R. (N. S.) 704, 706. And Mr. Justice Star~·, accounting for his 
contradietion of his own formr r opinion, quit<' proJWrl)· put thP matter: 
'My own error, howcve1·, can furnish no ground for its being adopted by 
this Court ... .' United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat .. 460, 478 . . . . If 
there are other Wil)'S of gracefullr and good-natun•dly smrendering former 
views to n better considered po~ition, I invokP them all." 
l H Compare 42 U. S. C. § 402 (g) (1) (E) (197(i) \\'ith id., § 402 (g) (1) 
(F)(i). 
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burden. If the class of beneficiaries were expanded in the 
fashion pressed by appellees, the beneficiaries, in terms of 
those who would exercise dominion over the benefits and 
whose freedom of choice would be enhanced thereby, would 
be unwed mothers, not illegitimate children. Certainly every 
governmental benefit has a ripple effect through familial rela-
tionships and the economy generally, its propagation deter-
mined by the proximity and sensibility of others. Possibly 
the largest class of incidental beneficiaries are those who are 
gratified in a nonmaterial way to see a friend or relative re-
ceive benefits. Some limits must be imposed for purposes 
of constitutional analysis, and we conclude that in this case 
the incidental, and, to a large degree. speculative impact on 
illegitimates as a class is not sufficient to treat the denial of 
mother's insurance benefits to unwed mothers as discrimina-
tion against illegitimate children. 
The Social Security Act and its amendments are the product 
of hard choices and countervailing pressures. The desire to 
alleviate hardship wherever it is found is tempered by the 
concern that the social security system in this country remain 
2. contributory insurance plan and not become a general 
welfare program. General welfare objectives are addressed 
through public assistance legislation. In light of the limited 
resources of the insurance fund, any expansion of the class of 
beneficiaries invariably poses the prospect of reduced benefits 
to individual claimants. We need look no further than the 
facts of this case for an illustration. The benefits available 
to Norman W. Boles' beneficiaries under the Act are limited 
by his earnings record. The effect of extending benefits to 
Gonzales will be to reduce benefits to Nancy Boles and her 
children by 20<fo.14 Thus the end result of extending benefits 
to Gonzales may be to deprive Nancy Boles of a meaningful 
choice between full-time employment and staying home with 
her children, thereby undermining the express legislative pur-
14 Brief for Appellant, at 29 n. 22. 
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pose of mother's insurance benefits. We think Congress could 
rationally choose to concentrate limited funds where the need 
is likely to be greatest. 
Because of our disposition of the Fifth Amendment issue, 
we need not and do not reach the Government's other argu-
ments: that the District Court improperly certified a nation-
wide class that included individuals who were not shown to 
have met the jurisdictional requirements of § 205 (g) of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g) , and that sovereign 
immunity barred that court's award of retroactive monetary 
relief. 
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly, 
Reversed. 
June 4, 1979 
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Dear Bill: 
Pl ease join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
... ,. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE J O HN PAUL STEVENS 
June 4, 1979 
Re: 78-808 - Califano v. Boles 
De ar Bi ll: 
Ple ase jo i n me. 
Respectfully, 
/L 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
,:§upunu Qfmttf n f t1! t ~b ,:§mtt s 
2.lfasfringicn. ~. <!f. 20',?)1-,;t · 
.JUSTI C E POTTER STEWART June 4, 1979 
Re: 78-808 - Califano v. Boles 
Dear Bill: 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
;§uprmu <!}aurt af tlrt ~nittb ;§taftg 
~lUlJri:nghttt. ~. <!}. 21lpJ.l.~ ' 
CHAMBERS OF 
, JIJSTII.F. BYRON R WHITE June 4, 1979 
Re: No. 78-808- Califano v. Boles 
Dear Bill, 
I shall await the dissent. 
Sincerely yours, 
f . . .,.. ' 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 4, 1979 
Re; No. 78~808 - Califano v . Boles 
Dear Bill: 
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CHAMI!SERS OF' 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
June 18, 1979 
Dear Bill: 
Re: 78-808 Califano v. Boles 
I join. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.:§uprtutt <4om1 cf tqt 'J!ittitt~ .iHatfg 
~rulfrittgilttt. ~. <.q. 20,?'!~ 
Re: No. 78-808 - Califano v. Boles 
Dear Bill: 
June 19, 1979 
I am awaiting the dissent, of course. I wonder, 
however, whether the first full paragraph on page 15, 
with its reference to a nationwide class, fully comports 
with the decision in No. 77-1511, Califano v. Yamasaki. 
Perhaps a footnote reference, or something like it, to 
Yamasaki is indicated. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.:§nprtntt Qfourlltf tlft ~t~ .:§faf:tg 
jiru!p:ttgtott. ~· "f. 2ll.;t~~ 
June 19, 1979 
Re: No. 78-808 - Califano v. Boles 
Dear Harry: 
Since in this case the Conference vote (by the narrowest 
of margins) was to decide against the respondents on the 
merits of their claim that the category of persons entitled 
to relief was too narrow under the Fifth Amendment, I think 
that the first full paragraph on page 15 of the opinion 
correctly declines to reach the government's other arguments, 
including the claim that the District Court improperly certified 
a nationwide class action that included individuals who had 
not met the jurisdictional requirements of§ 205(g). However, 
I joined you in Califano v. Yamasaki7 I am not a wild 
enthusiast of nation-wide class actions, but thought that the 
cautionary language which you placed in your opinion about the 
factors which the District Court should weigh before certifying 
such a class was enough for me (plus the fact that you already 
had a Court for your opinion when I joined, as I recall!). I 
also agree that our opinions should not appear to the public as 
ships passing in the night, and if all your note of June 19th 
indicates is the desirability of a simple citation to Yamasaki, 
at an appropriate place on page 15 of Boles, I have no objec-
tion if those who have already joined Boles have none. If you 
mean to suggest that we ought to pass on the propriety of the 
District Court's certification of a nation-wide class in Boles, 
notwithstanding the fact that we rule against the respondents 
on the merits, I do not agree with you. 
Mr. Justice Blackrnun 
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
June 20 ~ 1979 
Re: No. 78-808, Califano v. Boles 
Dear Bill , 
I agree with Harry that it would be a good 
idea to append a footnote reference to the Yamasaki 
case somewhere in the course of your discussion of 




Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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